Philosophical theism, in contemporary times, has been dominated by philosophers who are Christians. These theistic philosophers have published a great amount of literature defending the rationality of belief in God, and any participant in the great debate will surely be familiar with the names of intellectual giants like Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, among many others.
Swinburne, for example, gives theistic belief, and in particular Christian belief, philosophical treatment in toto. I have noticed the following progression in his case for Christianity. First, he argues that the notion of ‘God-talk’ is perfectly coherent, and there are no a priori reasons to reject theistic belief.
Of course, not all Christian philosophers have the evidentialist enthusiasm of Swinburne. The reformed epistemologists, spearheaded by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, approach theistic belief analytically, but not on evidentialist grounds.
These prefatory remarks are important to bear in mind, since I now wish to look at the philosophical tenability of the (orthodox) Christian depiction of God, which I feel has been largely ignored by contemporary Christian philosophers. My analysis will only be confined to divine ontology, and the contention I will be arguing for is that ‘Christian monotheism’ is ontologically incoherent. This has further implications for Christian particularism (in so far as it is understood by Pauline ontology), for if, on a priori grounds, the Christian depiction of God is impossible, then it follows a fortiori, that the doctrinal particulars which are contingent on this erroneous ontology cannot be true.
I am writing this piece with the intention of hearing from Christian philosophers who adhere to the Pauline ontology of God, believe in its coherence, and are willing to discuss the matter on rational grounds.
Locating Our Topic
Naturally, no insight is free from presuppositions, and so I will need to state the position from which my analysis is going to depart. The terminus of natural theology is usually a metaphysical postulation, some ‘first cause’, ‘intelligent designer’, ‘law giver’, or the like. The theist, of course, argues that this being is God. According to Swinburne, to state that God exists is to state that there is :
“A person without a body (i.e. a spirit), present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe, a free agent, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship.“
Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, p. 1
This is a definition of God that Jewish-Islamic theism can easily accept without any major difficulties, for this is the common understanding of God in Western theism. As far as divine ontology goes, it is a monotheistic definition : there is only one God, the Creator and Sustainer of the universe who exists. Understood thus, there is nothing obviously incoherent about postulating such a being. I will further assume that there are no a priori reasons for considering the existence of such a being (taking Swinburne’s definition) as impossible, due to some logical contradiction or the like (a defence of such a contention will be the task for another day).
Now the questions I wish to explore are these : When Swinburne’s definition of God is unpacked, and further explicated within orthodox Christian theism, is it still coherent ? Are there any a priori reasons for considering it to be incoherent, and thus impossible ? If so, what implications are there for orthodox Christian particulars ?
Stating Trinitarian Ontology
According to orthodox Christianity, although there exists a God as understood by Swinburne, He is tri-personal. In other words, God is three distinct persons (The Father, Son and Holy Spirit) in one substance, and yet He is still one being. To understand this, we can do no better than turn to the Athanasian Creed, where we find the following existential statements :
“[T]he Catholic Faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity. Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is all One, the Glory Equal, the Majesty Co-Eternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost … So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not Three Gods, but One God … there is One Father, not Three Fathers ; one Son, not Three Sons ; One Holy Ghost, not Three Holy Ghosts … He therefore that will be saved, must thus think of the Trinity.“
The Athanasian Creed, available online. I have summarized the idea behind the doctrine of the Trinity, although it is suggested the reader scrutinize the entire text.
Trying to make sense of the creed can be difficult, and therefore we can follow philosopher Richard Cartwright
- 1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. The Holy Spirit is God.
4. The Father is not the Son.
5. The Father is not the Holy Spirit.
6. The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
7. There is exactly one God.
From this point onwards, when I refer to the Christian understanding of God, it is in reference to the Athanasian Creed that my arguments are to be understood.
Can A Tri-Personal Deity Exist ?
Answering this question is very much an ontological exploration. We need to distinguish between a priori and a posteriori answers to the question of existence. By a priori answers, I am referring to answers which speak of conceptual possibilities or impossibilities. For example, there is a conceptual possibility that there exists in the world a unicorn. There is nothing in the definition of a unicorn which would immediately render its existence impossible. On the other hand, it is conceptually impossible that there exists in the world a married bachelor, since the notion of a married bachelor is incoherent. We know immediately a priori that such a being could not exist, ever.
By a posteriori answers, I am referring to propositions which we know the truth or falsity of through experience. Thus, although the existence of a unicorn is conceptually possible, most people do not believe that unicorns exist because of the lack of experience they have had, or lack of evidence. However, one would always be open to the evidence, since unicorns could exist. But it would be absurd to seek evidence for the existence of married bachelors, since it is conceptually impossible for such beings to exist.
Here, I am concerned with the definition of the Trinity, propositions (1)-(7) stated above. If any two of these propositions are contradictory, then it would be conceptually impossible for God, in so far as He is understood in orthodox Christian theism, to exist. And therefore, assessing the a posteriori evidence for or against the doctrine of the Trinity (as is often the case with the Biblical data) would be as meaningless as entertaining a married bachelor’s request for divorce.
Let the Father be designated by x, the Son by y, and the Holy Spirit by z. God, as defined by Swinburne, can be designated by G. As Cartwright notes, one way to interpret the creed is to take the verb ‘is’ and understand it to mean ‘is identical with’
Another possibility is to construe G as a general term
It seems we have a dilemma : if x, y and z are identical with G, then we simply have one person, or three names for one person. The heretical position of modalism comes to mind, where the eternal coexistence of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit is denied. But if x, y and z are a G (i.e. belong to a genera), then one has three divine persons, which of course is another heretical position : tri-theism. In the first instance, the contradiction can be removed by altering propositions (4)-(6). In the second, by altering (7). But taken altogether, (1)-(7) portray an inconsistent set. It follows ipso facto that the Christian God, as He is depicted in the Creed, cannot possibly exist.
Implications For Christian Particularism
Orthodox Christian ontology, as depicted in the Athanasian Creed, forms the basis for a number of Christian particulars. And these particulars are contingent upon the truth of the Christian ontology of God. The implications of ontological incoherence of the Trinity are that certain doctrinal particulars simply cannot be true. For example, the divinity of Jesus (the second person of the Trinity took on human form), the incarnation (which involves the second person in the Trinity being completely God and man simultaneously), etc. There seems to be an a priori blockade that prevents these doctrinal particulars from even getting off the ground.
Conclusions
To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity as presented in the Athanasian Creed depicts an ontologically incoherent model of God. To dissolve the contradictions which arise from analyzing the Creed, one can either reject the plurality of persons and hold that there exists a single person with different names or modes.
Alternatively, one can embrace tri-theism. As long as one is committed to neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance, as the Creed would have us do, one is holding beliefs about God which are logically inconsistent. And if one is to remain consistent with the philosophical treatment of theism in contemporary philosophy by the likes of Swinburne and Craig, it follows that the doctrine of the Trinity, and its relation to ‘Christian monotheism’ — being profoundly irrational — should be abandoned.
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Comments
20 responses to “Is The Trinitarian Ontology Coherent ?”
A few comments : One thing I’d like to add, based on my current reading in the new book “Who Wrote the Gospels?” by Randel Helms, on the differences between Marcan and Matthean theologies, is : Why did Jesus’ family, on hearing of Jesus’ commission, go “out to lay hold on him : for they said, He is beside himself” (Mark 3:21), even though Mary knew her son was on a divine mission, from the annunciation and from Joseph’s dream ?
As a theist, however, I do find one item particularly poor : If God exists, is it unreasonable to suppose that there would be at least one irrefutable proof of his existence. One could just as easily justify solipsism to oneself (who else is there?) by saying that if other people really existed (as first-person, feeling beings rather than as automaton’s or figments of my imagination), then there would be at least one irrefutable proof of their existence. Perhaps James is more concerned with the Biblical God, but one need not be a Christian to believe in God (not the biblical imitation).
On a similar question, while I find the doctrine of the trinity ridiculous, I don’t think it could not possibly be true (just that there is no reason to think it true). A better refutation of the trinity would be twofold : 1. Even if the Bible claimed it to be true, that wouldn’t make it so. 2. The Bible doesn’t even claim it. i.e., in the synoptic Gospels Jesus is the son of God, not God, so we have disagreement among the evangelists over this person being part of the godhead, and there is nothing in references to the “holy spirit” that indicates this is a person covalent with God. The Holy Spirit could be just another angel, like Gabriel, or maybe another name for the whole heavenly host of all angels, or who knows what ? BTW, I don’t find the concept impossible, because God is indeed beyond comprehension (that’s a reason why no possible Bible could ever allow us to comprehend God), and an analogy would be that if we tried to explain three-dimensional space to a person living,somehow, in a one-dimensional universe, would result in the same bewilderment we feel at the other type of trinity. Space ? Dimension ? what’s the difference he would say. But I repeat, I see no need for the hypothesis of a trinity.
Read that first part of that article till it got to about here :
“But it would be absurd to seek evidence for the existence of married bachelors, since it is conceptually impossible for such beings to exist.”
And then I stopped. Why you might ask ?
Let me ask you a question ? Do you expect to be able to logically understand God and quantify him mathematically ? This is (as you would say) an infinite being. God exists outside of the physical laws and restrictions of the space in which you inhabit. All of your logic is tied to this physical universe, but it wouldn’t restrict God because he isn’t contained by it. Maybe the properties of this space allow a married bachelor. How do you know ?
Now, lets ask this question :
“Okay, if God created the universe — who created God?”
Does this question make sense ? No ? Well, its certainly not a very good one because it assumes that time and causality exist in the same way in the space God inhabits to that in our universe. Causality maybe didn’t exist before the creation of the universe, and maybe didn’t exist in the different properties of the space in which God inhabits, or maybe its completely different. Maybe an event happens first, and then the thing that caused it happened afterwards. We JUST DON’T KNOW.
And this is where we get into problems.…For example here
“Let the Father be designated by x, the Son by y, and the Holy Spirit by z. God, as defined by Swinburne, can be designated by G. As Cartwright notes, one way to interpret the creed is to take the verb ‘is’ and understand it to mean ‘is identical with’8, therefore, x = G, y = G, and z = G. But if this is true, then it logically follows (according to Leibniz’s principle of identity, which states : if x is the same object as y then x has exactly the same properties that y has) that x = y, x = z, and y = z. However, the creed will not allow this : (4)-(6). The Father, Son and Holy Sprit are different and distinct from each other.”
You are evaluating something using the mathematics/physics of this space that exists in another space with almost certainly a completely different set of mathematics/physics governing it and expecting to get a sensible answer ? Its whole possible that in this space the Creed WILL follow this. Do you think that you should be able to quantify what God is ? It doesn’t make sense to assume that the logic of your world also restricts God.
Ultimately, using logic tied to the mathematic space that we know holds true in this universe and applying it to anything which is not wholey contained BY this mathematical space is utterly pointless. We can really reliably infer anything about anything that is not contained wholely and restricted wholey by the nature of the space in which we inhabit. The maths is broken. This is why it will never be possible to be able to look back _beyond_the singularity at the inception of the big bang, because all physics breaks down and we have no means to do it.
Some quick comments…
First, “kudos” to MENJ for mirroring Imran Aijaz’ article. Many of his extremely well written pieces were apparently lost as his site underwent revision some time ago, and that is an unfortunate loss indeed, since Imran is one of the most brillian Muslims on the net.
Regarding George’s post from February 15th, one portion which I wish to view in isolation (i.e. unrelated to the rest of the stuff he wrote) is the following :
“the equation is not G = x, G = z, G = y, but G = (x + y + z), which is to my mind perfectly coherent.”
I think this scratches the surface of a proper response to Imran’s argument. I agree with Imran that it is a contradiction to claim that each Person is identical to the Godhead yet not identical to one another. I also agree with Imran that it would be a contradiction to claim that each person is a god yet there is only one god. But there is another solution…
The response to Imran is inspired by William Lane Craig’s approach to the doctrine of the Trinity (cf. his book, “Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview”). It holds that the three Persons are not by themselves deities, but rather divine beings which are each a proper part of a single Deity. When it is said that “Jesus is God,” the copula of such a proposition is interpretated as one of predication rather than identity (i.e. the statement is that Jesus is divine, but not The God [of Abraham]). Interestingly enough, this position has support in the Greek text of John 1:1. Regardless, putting Biblical support (or lack thereof) aside for a moment, I would like to offer a logically coherent version of the Trinity, put forth in the language of formal logic, and then explained.
But first let me describe some of the symbols I weill employ :
G’x will represent that x is a member of the class of things which are “God” in a sense of predication (i.e. divine or in possession of some of the attributes of deity) and proper
parts of the Godhead.
The similar looking construction Gx (the difference between this and the above might be vocalized G‑prime-of‑x and G‑of‑x, respectively) will state something different, namely that x is a deity.
I will use the constants f, j, h, and ixGx to represent the Father, Jesus, the Holy Ghost and the Godhead, respectively (with regard to ixGx, this is taken from Brian Leftow’s employment of Russell’s definite description operator, but if anyone objects, they can simply replace ixGx with g).
x –> y will represent “if x, then y”
~ will represent negation (e.g. ~x means not‑x)
= will be used to represent identity
& will be used as the conjunctive connective
x y will represent the biconditional (i.e. both if x then y as well as if y then x)
x.P.y will represent the relation function such that x is a proper part of y
{x,y,z} will represent the set/class containing x, y and z
x.U.y will represent x and y being united within the Godhead in some way
(x) will represent the universal quantifier (i.e. for all x)
(Ex) will represent the existential quantifier (i.e. for some x, or there is at least one x such that)
With that, the doctrine might be written as follows :
1. (x)(Gx (x = ixGx))
2. ~(Ex)(Gx & ~(x = ixGx))
3. (x)(G’x –> x.P.ixGx)
4. (x)(y)((x.P.ixGx & y.P.ixGx) –> x.U.y)
5. G’f
6. G’j
7. G’h
8. ~Gf
9. ~Gj
10. ~Gh
11. (~(f = j) & ~(f = h)) & ~(j = h)
12. {f,j,h} = ixGx
ELUCIDATION : The first proposition notes that anything which is identical to the Godhead is a deity, and the second proposition notes that there does not exist any being which is a deity and not identical to the Godhead. In other words, the first two propositions are statements of Monotheism (there is only one deity, and that is the Godhead). The third proposition notes that any being which is God in a sense of predication (i.e. divine or in the possession of some of the attributes of deity) is a proper part of the Godhead (and it logically follows by denying th consequent that those beings which are not proper parts of the Godhead are not “God” in a sense of predication). The fourth proposition states that any two (or more) beings who are proper parts of the Godhead are united within the Godhead. I make no attempt to explain *how* they are united ; rather I am simply asserting that they are united in some way. The fifth, sixth and seventh propositions note that the Father, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit are each God in a sense of predication. The eighth, ninth, and tenth propositions specifically deny that any of these persons are deities by themselves, nor is any of them (by virtue of the first proposition) identical to the Godhead. The eleventh proposition notes that none of the three persons are identical to one another. The twelfth proposition notes that the Godhead is identical to the combined set of the three persons in toto. Note however that this is for these constants specifically — no hard and fast rule was stated where an object is necessarily identical to the collection of its member parts. The point is that an object *can* be identical with the collection of its proper parts in toto, and in this case it is. This doctrine is logically coherent (i.e. there is nothing self contradictory about it).
George, why restrict your god to 3 persons, why not 4, 5, 6. If what you say is true then god is so powerful that he can be one and have billion persons at the same time (eg, Fater, Mother, Son, Daughter, Spirit, Grand-son, Grand-daughter, …)